This is decidedly longer than what I usually send but
Friend George Friedman has, as is his wont, put together a piece which is
'spot-on'. Please read.
We have long argued that the Arab-Israeli conflict is inherently insoluble. Now, for the third time in recent years, a war is being fought
in Gaza. The Palestinians are firing rockets into Israel with minimal effect.
The Israelis are carrying out a broader operation to seal tunnels along the
Gaza-Israel boundary. Like the previous wars, the current one will settle
nothing. The Israelis want to destroy Hamas' rockets. They can do so only if
they occupy Gaza and remain there for an extended period while engineers search
for tunnels and bunkers throughout the territory. This would generate Israeli
casualties from Hamas guerrillas fighting on their own turf with no room for
retreat. So Hamas will continue to launch rockets, but between the extreme
inaccuracy of the rockets and Israel's Iron Dome defense system, the group will
inflict little damage to the Israelis.War Without a Military
OutcomeThe most interesting aspect of this war is that both
sides apparently found it necessary, despite knowing it would have no definitive
military outcome. The kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers followed
by the incineration of a Palestinian boy triggered this conflict. An argument of
infinite regression always rages as to the original sin: Who committed the first crime?For the Palestinians, the original crime was the
migration into the Palestinian mandate by Jews, the creation of the State of
Israel and the expulsion of Arabs from that state. For Israel, the original sin
came after the 1967 war, during which Israel captured the West Bank, Gaza, the
Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. At that moment, the Israelis were prepared to
discuss a deal, but the Arabs announced their famous "three nos" at a meeting in
Khartoum: no negotiation, no recognition, no peace. That locked the Israelis
into an increasingly rigid stance. Attempts at negotiations have followed the
Khartoum declaration, all of which failed, and the "no recognition" and "no
peace" agreement is largely intact. Cease-fires are the best that anyone can
hope for.For Hamas, at least -- and I suspect for many
Palestinians in the West Bank -- the only solution is Israel's elimination. For
many Israelis, the only solution is to continue to occupy all captured
territories until the Palestinians commit to peace and recognition. Since the
same Israelis do not believe that day will ever come, the occupation would
become permanent. Under these circumstances, the Gaza war is in some sense
a matter of housekeeping. For Hamas, the point of the operation is demonstrating
it can fire rockets at Israel. These rockets are inaccurate, but
the important thing is that they were smuggled into Gaza at all, since this
suggests more dangerous weapons eventually will be smuggled in to the
Palestinian territory. At the same time, Hamas is demonstrating that it remains
able to incur casualties while continuing to fight. For the Israelis, the point of the operation is that they
are willing to carry it out at all. The Israelis undoubtedly intend to punish
Gaza, but they do not believe they can impose their will on Gaza and compel the
Palestinians to reach a political accommodation with Israel. War's purpose is to
impose your political will on your enemy. But unless the Israelis surprise us
immensely, nothing decisive will come out of this conflict. Even if Israel
somehow destroyed Hamas, another organization would emerge to fill its space in
the Palestinian ecosystem. Israel can't go far enough to break the Palestinian
will to resist; it is dependent on a major third-party state to help meet
Israeli security needs. This creates an inherent contradiction whereby Israel
receives enough American support to guarantee its existence but because of
humanitarian concerns is not allowed to take the kind of decisive action that
might solve its security problem.We thus see periodic violence of various types, none of
which will be intended or expected to achieve any significant political outcome.
Wars here have become a series of bloodstained gestures. There are some limited
ends to achieve, such as closing Palestinian tunnels and demonstrating
Palestinian capabilities that force Israel into an expensive defensive posture.
But Hamas will not be defeated, and Israel will make no concessions.Sovereignty and Viability
ProblemsThe question therefore is not what the point of all this
is -- although that is a fascinating subject -- but where all this ends. All
things human end. Previous longstanding conflicts, such as those between France
and England, ended or at least changed shape. Israel and Palestine accordingly
will resolve their conflict in due course.Many believe the creation of a Palestinian state will be
the solution, and those who believe this often have trouble understanding why
this self-evidently sensible solution has not been implemented. The reason is
the proposed solution is not nearly as sensible as it might appear to
some.Issues of viability and sovereignty surround any
discussion of a Palestinian state. Geography raises questions about the
viability of any Palestinian polity. Palestine has two population centers, Gaza
and the West Bank, which are detached from one another. One population center,
Gaza, is an enormously crowded, narrow salient. Its ability to develop a
sustainable economy is limited. The West Bank has more possibilities, but even
it would be subordinate to a dynamic Israel. If the Palestinian workforce is
drawn into the Israeli economy, both territories will become adjuncts to Israel.
Within its current borders, a viable Palestine is impossible to
imagine.From the Israeli point of view, creating a Palestine
along something resembling the 1967 lines (leaving aside the question of
Jerusalem) would give the Palestinians superb targets, namely, Tel Aviv and
Haifa. Given its history, Israel is unlikely to take that risk unless it had the
right to oversee security in the West Bank in some way. That in turn would
undermine Palestinian sovereignty.As you play out the possibilities in any two-state
solution, you run into the problem that any solution one side demanded would be
unbearable to the other. Geography simply won't permit two sovereign states. In
this sense, the extremists on both sides are more realistic than the moderates.
But that reality encounters other problems. Israel's High-Water MarkCurrently, Israel is as secure as it is ever likely to be
unless Hamas disappears, never to be replaced, and the West Bank becomes even
more accommodating to Israel. Neither of these prospects is likely. Israel's
economy towers over its neighbors. The Palestinians are weak and divided. None
of Israel's neighbors pose any threat of invasion, a situation in place since
the 1977 neutralization of Egypt. Jordan is locked into a close relation with
Israel, Egypt has its peace treaty and Hezbollah is bogged down in Syria. Apart
from Gaza, which is a relatively minor threat, Israel's position is difficult to
improve.Israel can't radically shift its demography. But several
evolutions in the region could move against Israel. Egypt could change
governments, renounce its treaty, rearm and re-enter the Sinai Peninsula.
Hezbollah could use its experience in Syria to open a front in Lebanon. Syria
could get an Islamic State-led government and threaten the Golan Heights.
Islamists could overthrow Jordan's Hashemite monarchy and pose a threat to the
east. Turkey could evolve into a radical Islamic government and send forces to
challenge Israel. A cultural revolution could take place in the Arab world that
would challenge Israel's economic superiority, and therefore its ability to wage
war. Iran could smuggle missiles into Gaza, and so on.There is accordingly an asymmetry of possibilities. It is
difficult to imagine any evolution, technical, political or economic, that would
materially improve Israel's already dominant position, but there are many things
that could weaken Israel -- some substantially. Each may appear far-fetched at
the moment, but everything in the future seems far-fetched. None is
inconceivable.It is a rule of politics and business to bargain from
strength. Israel is now as strong as it is going to be. But Israel does not
think that it can reach an accommodation with the Palestinians that would
guarantee Israeli national security, a view based on a realistic reading of
geography. Therefore, Israel sees little purpose in making concessions to the
Palestinians despite its relative position of strength. In these circumstances, the Israeli strategy is to
maintain its power at a maximum level and use what influence it has to prevent
the emergence of new threats. From this perspective, the Israeli strategy on
settlements makes sense. If there will be no talks, and Israel must maintain its
overwhelming advantage, creating strategic depth in the West Bank is sensible;
it would be less sensible if there were a possibility of a peace treaty. Israel
must also inflict a temporary defeat on any actively hostile Palestinian force
from time to time to set them back several years and to demonstrate Israeli
capabilities for psychological purposes.The Palestinian position meanwhile must be to maintain
its political cohesion and wait, using its position to try to drive wedges
between Israel and its foreign patrons, particularly the United States, but
understanding that the only change in the status quo will come from changes
outside the Israeli-Palestinian complex. The primary Palestinian problem will be
to maintain itself as a distinct entity with sufficient power to resist an
Israeli assault for some time. Any peace treaty would weaken the Palestinians by
pulling them into the Israeli orbit and splitting them up. By refusing a peace
treaty, they remain distinct, if divided. That guarantees they will be there
when circumstances change.Fifty Years OutIsrael's major problem is that circumstances always
change. Predicting the military capabilities of the Arab and Islamic worlds in
50 years is difficult. Most likely, they will not be weaker than they are today,
and a strong argument can be made that at least several of their constituents
will be stronger. If in 50 years some or all assume a hostile posture against
Israel, Israel will be in trouble. Time is not on Israel's side. At some point, something
will likely happen to weaken its position, while it is unlikely that anything
will happen to strengthen its position. That normally would be an argument for
entering negotiations, but the Palestinians will not negotiate a deal that would
leave them weak and divided, and any deal that Israel could live with would do
just that.What we are seeing in Gaza is merely housekeeping, that
is, each side trying to maintain its position. The Palestinians need to maintain
solidarity for the long haul. The Israelis need to hold their strategic
superiority as long as they can. But nothing lasts forever, and over time, the
relative strength of Israel will decline. Meanwhile, the relative strength of
the Palestinians may increase, though this isn't certain.Looking at the relative risks, making a high-risk deal
with the Palestinians would seem prudent in the long run. But nations do not
make decisions on such abstract calculations. Israel will bet on its ability to
stay strong. From a political standpoint, it has no choice. The Palestinians
will bet on the long game. They have no choice. And in the meantime, blood will
periodically flow. Jim Morris Twilight Imagery, Inc. |
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